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1.  Introduction 
In response to slow progress in the Doha Round, Asia-Pacific countries have 
accelerated bilateral and regional trade initiatives. While global free trade is the ultimate 
goal, many countries strive not to be left out of the recent wave of free-trade agreements 
(FTAs). Negotiations for two mega-regional FTAs – Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and 
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) – are in progress.1 Japan joined 
TPP negotiations in July 2013 as the 12th member, and Korea has considered its merits 
and demerits of participating in the TPP. RCEP was launched in November 2012 and 
negotiations among 10 ASEAN countries and their six FTA partners started in May 2013. 
Both the TPP and RCEP are open to new members, and some other Asian countries are 
expected to join the TPP in the medium term. Over the longer term, enlarged TPP and/or 
enlarged RCEP might lead to the creation of a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific 
(FTAAP). 
The objectives of this paper are twofold. First, by providing several plausible 
sequences of region-wide FTAs in the Asia-Pacific, we offer results that are highly policy 
relevant. Second, we examine additional effects of mega-regional FTAs, including the 
positive impact on productivity, the cost-mitigating effect of consolidating FTAs, and 
FTA-induced agricultural policy reforms in Japan. Using a global dynamic applied general 
equilibrium model, we evaluate the welfare and sectoral output effects under various FTA 
scenarios. In Scenario 1, we assume that an RCEP agreement is signed in 2017 and 
implemented over the 2018-2027 period. Taiwan is assumed to join the RCEP in 2022 and 
completes implementation with the RCEP countries in 2030. In Scenario 2, we assume that 
the 12 countries that are currently negotiating a TPP agreement plus Korea (TPP-13) will 
implement a trade accord over the period 2016-25.2 Three additional countries – Indonesia,  
the Philippines and Thailand – join the TPP in 2020 and complete preferential 
liberalization with the TPP-13 countries in 2029 (TPP-16). Scenario 3 is the same as 
                                                 
1 The twelve negotiating countries of the TPP are Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, 
Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, United States and Vietnam. The sixteen negotiating countries 
of the RCEP are Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, China, Lao PDR, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, 
Malaysia, Myanmar, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. 
2 Although the twelve negotiating countries are likely to sign a TPP agreement first, Korea is expected 
to be approved as a new member in a relatively short period thereafter. 
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Scenario 2, except that China, India and Taiwan join TPP-16 in 2024 to form TPP-19. It is 
assumed that 70% of the three new members’ preferential liberalization with TPP-16 will 
be effectuated in 2030. In Scenario 4A, TPP-13 and TPP-16 are implemented during 2016-
2025 and 2019-2028, respectively. In addition, TPP-19 and FTAAP start from 2022 and 
2025, respectively, in which 90% of TPP-19 and 60% of FTAAP are completed in 2030.  
Scenarios 4B-4D assume the same FTA sequencing as Scenario 4A, but include 
additional assumptions. Coe and Helpman (1995), Coe et al. (2009), Trefler (2004), 
Lileeva (2008), Chen et al. (2009) and Wolszczak-Derlacz (2014) suggest that import and 
export penetrations result in an increase in productivity.3 Scenario 4B adds an assumption 
that productivity, measured by efficiency on overall output, for manufacturing sectors is 
assumed to increase from 1% a year to 1.1% a year in the TPP-13, TPP-16, TPP-19 and 
FTAAP countries during 2016-18, 2019-21, 2022-24 and 2025-30, respectively. In 
addition to increases in productivity, Scenario 4C assumes that real trade cost will fall by 
0.1% per year among the TPP-13, TPP-16 and TPP-19 countries during 2016-18, 2019-21 
and 2022-24, respectively. In addition, it is assumed to fall by 0.2% per year among the 
FTAAP countries during 2025-30. Finally, Scenario 4D adds an assumption that 
productivity of Japan’s agricultural sectors increases from 1% to 1.5% per annum starting 
in 2018, resulting from its policy reforms.4  
A number of studies have quantified the effects of various FTAs in the Asia-Pacific 
region using a CGE model (e.g., Cheong, 2013; Itakura and Lee, 2012; Kawai and 
Wignaraja, 2009; Lee et al., 2009; Li and Whalley, 2014; Petri, Plummer and Zhai, 
2012ab). While Petri et al.’s (2012b) study was the first to examine the effects of “Asian 
track” and “Trans-Pacific track” of FTA sequencings, RCEP had not been launched at the 
                                                 
3 Coe and Helpman (1995) and Coe et al. (2009) show that imports of technology-embodied products 
accelerate productivity growth in the recipient country. Trefler (2004) finds that the Canada-U.S. FTA 
resulted in large increases in labor productivity in industries with steep tariff cuts, whereas Lileeva 
(2008) finds that Canada’s tariff cuts raised industry-level productivity by increasing the market shares 
of highly productive plants. Using a trade model with firm heterogeneity, Chen et al. (2009) show that 
trade openness exerts a positive effect on productivity and a negative effect on markups in the short run. 
Joanna (2014) finds that both import and export penetrations are positively associated with an increase 
in total factor productivity (TFP). 
4 Mercurio (2014) suggests that the TPP may become the catalyst needed for the structural reform 
agenda of the Japanese government. 
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time of their writing. As a result, the Asian track of a China-Japan-Korea FTA, followed 
by ASEAN+3 FTA (EAFTA) and FTAAP in their study is no longer realistic. One of our 
aims is to construct FTA sequences that are reasonable estimates of the future sequences of 
region-wide FTAs in the Asia-Pacific.  
Using an 11-country numerical general equilibrium model, Li and Whalley (2014) 
investigate how China’s participation in the TPP would affect China and other countries. 
Whereas their study includes only aggregate results, a significant share of TPP negotiations 
has been devoted to sectoral issues, such as agriculture, automobiles, insurance and other 
services. Their model has only two sectors, and the tradable sector includes extremely 
heterogeneous sectors, such as agriculture, textiles and apparel, electronics products and 
automobiles. However, there are large differences in tariff rates, relative factor 
endowments and technology among these sectors. By constructing a 22-region, 32-sector 
model, this study attempts to overcome the aggregation bias inherent in highly aggregated 
models. 
An overview of the model and data is given in the next section, followed by 
descriptions of the baseline and policy scenarios in Section 3. In Section 4 assessments of 
welfare and sectoral output effects under each policy scenario are offered. Concluding 
remarks are provided in the final section. 
 
2.  Analytical Framework and Data 
2.1  Overview of the Dynamic GTAP Model 
The numerical simulations undertaken for this study are derived from the dynamic 
GTAP model, described in detail by Ianchovichina and McDougall (2001) and 
Ianchovichina and Walmsley (2012). This model extends the comparative static framework 
of the standard GTAP model developed by Hertel (1997) to the dynamic framework by 
incorporating international capital mobility and capital accumulation. The dynamic GTAP 
model allows international capital mobility and capital accumulation, while it preserves all 
the features of the standard GTAP, such as constant returns to production technology, 
perfectly competitive markets, and product differentiation by countries of origin, in 
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keeping with the so-called Armington assumption.5  At the same time, it enhances the 
investment theory by incorporating international capital mobility and ownership. In this 
way it captures important FTA effects on investment and wealth that are missed by a static 
model. 
In the dynamic GTAP model, each of the regions is endowed with fixed physical 
capital stock owned by domestic firms. The physical capital is accumulated over time with 
new investment. This dynamics are driven by net investment, which is sourced from 
regional households’ savings. The savings in one region are invested directly in domestic 
firms and indirectly in foreign firms, which are in turn reinvested in all regions. The 
dynamics arising from positive savings in one region is related to the dynamics from the 
net investment in other regions. Overall, at the global level, it must hold that all the savings 
across regions are completely invested in home and overseas markets. 
In the short run, an equalization of the rates of return seems unrealistic, and there 
exist well-known empirical observations for “home bias” in savings and investment. These 
observations suggest that capital is not perfectly mobile, causing some divergence in the 
rates of return across regions. The dynamic GTAP model allows inter-regional differences 
in the rates of return in the short run, which will be eventually equalized in the very long 
run. It is assumed that differences in the rates of return are attributed to the errors in 
investors’ expectations about the future rates of return. During the process, these errors are 
gradually adjusted to the actual rate of return as time elapses, and eventually they are 
eliminated and a unified rate of return across regions can be attained. Income accruing 
from the ownership of the foreign and domestic assets can then be appropriately 
incorporated into total regional income. 
Participating in an FTA could lead to more investment from abroad. Trade 
liberalization often makes prices of goods in a participating country lower due to removal 
of tariffs, creating an increase in demand for the goods. Responding to the increased 
                                                 
5 See Armington (1969). The model uses a nested CES structure, where at the top nested level, each 
agent chooses to allocate aggregate demand between domestically produced goods and an aggregate 
import bundle, while minimizing the overall cost of the aggregate demand bundle. At the second level, 
aggregate import demand is allocated across different trading partners, again using a CES specification, 
wherein the aggregate costs of imports are minimized. 
 6
demand, production of the goods expands in the member country. The expansion of 
production is attained by using more intermediate inputs, labor, capital, and other primary 
factor inputs. These increased demands for production inputs raise the corresponding 
prices, wage rates, and rental rates. Higher rental rates are translated into higher rates of 
return, attracting more investment from both home and foreign countries. 
 
2.2  Data, aggregation, and initial tariffs 
In this study we employ the GTAP database version 8.1, which has a 2007 base 
year and distinguishes 129 countries/regions and 57 sectors (Narayanan et al., 2012). For 
the purposes of the present study, the data has been aggregated to 22 countries/regions and 
32 sectors, as shown in Table 1. Foreign income data are obtained from the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF)’s Balance of Payments Statistics, which are used to track 
international capital mobility and foreign wealth. The values of key parameters, such as 
demand, supply and CES substitution elasticities, are based upon previous empirical 
estimates. The model calibration primarily consists of calculating share and shift 
parameters to fit the model specifications to the observed data, so as to be able to 
reproduce a solution for the base year.  
The sectoral tariff rates for the 22 countries/regions in 2007 are summarized in 
Table 2. There are striking differences in the tariff structures across the countries/regions. 
Singapore is duty free with the exception of alcohol and tobacco. The exceptionally high 
tariff rate on rice in Japan stands out. The tariff rates in a number of other agricultural and 
food products in Japan are also high, as well as in Korea and India. With the exception of 
Australia, New Zealand and Chile, the tariff rates on some agricultural and food products 
are also relatively high in other regions, such as sugar in the United States, Russia and the 
EU, dairy products and meats in Canada, and rice in the Philippines. In manufacturing the 
tariff rates on textiles and apparel are relatively high in all regions except China, Singapore, 
Chile and the EU. The tariff rate on motor vehicles exceeds 20% in Thailand, Vietnam and 
India. 
Ad valorem tariff equivalents of nontariff barriers (NTBs) in nine services sectors 
are computed as unweighted averages of the gravity-model estimates of Wang et al. (2009) 
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and the values employed by the Michigan Model of World Production and Trade (e.g. 
Brown, Kiyota and Stern, 2010). There are even greater variations in tariff equivalents of 
NTBs in services than in commodities. 
 
3.  The Baseline and Policy Scenarios 
3.1  The Baseline Scenario  
In order to evaluate the effects of region-wide FTAs in the Asia-Pacific, the 
baseline scenario is first established, showing the path of each of the 22 economies/regions 
over the period 2007-2030. The baseline contains information on macroeconomic variables 
as well as expected policy changes. The macroeconomic variables in the baseline include 
projections for real GDP, gross investment, capital stocks, population, skilled and unskilled 
labor, and total labor. Real GDP projections were obtained from IMF’s World Economic 
Outlook Database. The data on gross fixed capital formation were acquired from the 
IMF’s IFS Online. Projections for population were taken from the U.S. Census Bureau’s 
International Data Base, while those for labor were obtained from International Labor 
Organisation (ILO)’s Economically Active Population Estimates and Populations. 
The projections for population, investment, skilled labor and unskilled labor 
obtained for over 150 countries were aggregated, and the growth rates were calculated to 
obtain the macroeconomic shocks describing the baseline. Changes in the capital stocks 
were not imposed exogenously, but were determined endogenously as the accumulation of 
projected investment. Any changes in real GDP not explained by the changes in 
endowments are attributed to technological change. 
In addition, policy projections are also introduced into the baseline. The policies 
included in the baseline are those which are already agreed upon and legally binding, 
including the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), the ASEAN-China, ASEAN-Korea, 
ASEAN-Japan, ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand, ASEAN-India, EU-Korea, and Korea-US 
FTAs. It is assumed that tariffs are cut by 80% among the member countries of the FTAs 
that are being implemented. Rice is excluded from tariff liberalization in FTAs that include 
Japan or Korea as a member country. 
 8
 
3.2  Policy Scenarios 
Welfare and sectoral output effects of mega-regional FTAs and their implications 
for Japan and other Asia-Pacific countries are to be evaluated in this study. The following 
seven scenarios are designed and summarized in Table 3. 
Scenario 1 (RCEP): RCEP over the period 2018-2027 and RCEP + Taiwan from 2022-
2030. 
Scenario 2 (TPP): TPP-13 over the period 2016-2025 and TPP-16 from 2020-2029.  
Scenario 3 (Enlarged TPP): TPP-13 from 2016-2025, TPP-16 from 2020-2029 and TPP-
19 from 2024. 70% of TPP-19 is assumed to be implemented in 2030.  
Scenario 4A (Trans-Pacific): TPP-13 from 2016-2025 and TPP-16 from 2019-2028. TPP-
19 and FTAAP start from 2022 and 2025, respectively, in which 90% of TPP-19 and 60% 
of FTAAP are assumed to be implemented in 2030. 
Scenario 4B (Trans-Pacific with productivity gain): Same as Scenario 4A, except that 
efficiency on overall output for manufacturing sectors is assumed to increase from 1% a 
year to 1.1% a year in the TPP-13, TPP-16, TPP-19 and FTAAP countries during 2016-18, 
2019-21, 2022-24 and 2025-30, respectively. 
Scenario 4C (Trans-Pacific with productivity gain and trade cost reduction): Same as 
Scenario 4B, except that real trade cost is assumed to fall by 0.1% per year among the 
TPP-13, TPP-16 and TPP-19 countries during 2016-18, 2019-21 and 2022-24, respectively. 
In addition, it is assumed to fall by 0.2% per year among the FTAAP countries during 
2025-30. 
Scenario 4D (Trans-Pacific with productivity gain, trade cost reduction and Japan’s 
agricultural policy reform): Same as Scenario 4C, except that efficiency on overall output 
for Japan’s agricultural sectors is assumed to increase from 1% a year to 1.5% a year 
starting from 2018. 
In all scenarios rice is excluded from tariff liberalization. It is assumed that tariff 
rates on commodities other than rice decline linearly to zero and tariff equivalents of NTBs 
in services are reduced by 20 percent during the periods in consideration among the 
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member countries. In addition, time cost of trade – e.g. shipping delays arising from 
regulatory procedures and inadequate infrastructure – is assumed to fall by 20 percent 
among them.6 Since manufacturing firms are much more exposed than non-manufacturing 
firms to foreign competition in both domestic and export markets, we assume that 
additional productivity growth occurs only in manufacturing sectors in Scenarios 4B-4D. 
Scenarios 4C-4D add an assumption that formations of mega-regional FTAs will result in 
reductions in compliance costs associated with rules of origin (ROOs). As bilateral FTAs 
are consolidated, compliance costs are projected to fall, leading to a reduction in real trade 
cost.7  
Petri, Plummer and Zhai (2012b) also compare between Asian-track and Trans-
Pacific-track FTA sequencings. There are, however, three notable differences between 
their scenarios and ours. First, we allow FTAAP to start before the full implementation of 
the TPP. Since the TPP is open to new members, it is likely that it would include a number 
of Asian economies before it is fully implemented. Second, while Petri et al. (2012b) 
assume that a China-Japan-Korea (CJK) FTA is implemented first in the Asian track, we 
assume that an RCEP agreement would be reached roughly at the same time as a CJK FTA. 
This is because there are high political tensions, including territorial disputes, between 
China and Japan, as well as between Japan and Korea. Such disputes and tensions 
represent an additional barrier that must be surmounted in negotiations aiming to fashion 
an FTA. Third, mainly because RCEP negotiations started more than three years after the 
first round of TPP negotiations in Melbourne, we assume that it takes a few years longer 
for the RCEP to reach an agreement than the TPP.  
Two caveats should be borne in mind when interpreting the results presented in the 
next section. First, investment liberalization among the member countries is not considered 
because it requires data on foreign direct investment (FDI) flows by source and host 
countries and industry, which are unavailable. A challenging extension of the paper would 
                                                 
6 For a detailed analysis of time cost of trade, see Hummels and Schaur (2013) and Minor (2013). 
7 Baldwin and Kawai (2013) suggest that administrative costs of using FTAs might increase when the 
number of bilateral FTAs increase in the region. However, over the long term these costs are likely to 
fall, as a relatively large percentage of firms utilizing FTA preferences uses mega-regional FTAs (such 
as TPP, RCEP and FTAAP) and a relatively small percentage uses bilateral FTAs. 
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be to endogenize FDI flows to consider attraction of these flows to developing member 
countries, which may have a significant impact, as were the cases for Mexico joining 
NAFTA in 1994 and Spain and Portugal joining the EU in 1986. Second, NTBs in 
manufacturing are not incorporated in this study due to a lack of reliable empirical 
estimates. NTBs also exist in a number of manufacturing sectors, including automobiles, 
pharmaceutical products, and some food products. In these products regulatory and other 
barriers, such as stringent standards and testing and certification procedures, exist. Thus, 
reductions of NTBs in manufacturing are expected to enlarge the benefits of the FTAs. 
These issues are left for future research. 
 
4.  Empirical Findings 
4.1  Welfare Effects 
Economic welfare is largely determined by four factors: (1) allocative efficiency, 
(2) the terms of trade, (3) the contribution to equivalent variation (EV) of change in the 
price of capital investment goods, and (4) the contribution to EV of change in equity 
owned by a region. The fourth factor is determined by the change in equity income from 
ownership of capital endowments, and it can be further decomposed into three parts: a 
change in the domestic capital stock, a change in household income earned on capital 
abroad, and a change in the domestic capital owned by foreigners. 
With respect to these four factors, the direction of a welfare change may be 
summarized as follows. The allocative efficiency effect is generally positive for members 
of region-wide FTAs. This effect is particularly large for a country with high average 
initial tariffs. However, it may become negative when the extent of trade diversion is 
considerably large in FTAs with relatively low intraregional trade. The terms-of-trade 
effect is usually positive for the members with low average initial tariffs and negative for 
those with high initial tariffs. An increase in the price of capital investment goods 
generally raises welfare. A welfare change resulting from a change in the equity holdings 
is positive if the sum of the region’s foreign income receipts and an increase in the 
domestic capital stock is greater than the foreign income payment, and vice versa. 
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The welfare results for the seven policy scenarios, as percentage deviations in 
equivalent variation from the baseline for the years 2020, 2025 and 2030, are summarized 
in Table 4. Under Scenario 1, the welfare level of all RCEP countries increases in 2020-
2030, whereas that of Taiwan increases in 2025-2030. The welfare gains in 2030 for the 
RCEP countries and Taiwan range from 0.5% (India) to 3.4% (Korea and Taiwan). The 
economic welfare of several nonmember regions decreases slightly in 2020, 2025 and/or 
2030.8  
In Scenario 2, economic welfare of envisaged TPP-16 members increases during 
2025-2030. The welfare gains in 2030 for the TPP-16 countries range from 0.2% (United 
States) to 2.7% (Vietnam). A comparison of welfare gains in the first two scenarios 
suggest that more Asian countries are expected to realize larger welfare gains under 
Scenario 1, but the differences are relatively small except for Korea. Korea’s gain is 
significantly smaller under Scenario 2, since not only it is currently implementing a 
bilateral FTA with the United States, which is already included in the baseline scenario, 
but it is also highly dependent on trade with China, a nonmember of the TPP. In Scenario 3, 
China, India and Taiwan are assumed to join the TPP, which will consist of 19 members 
(TPP-19) by 2024. The welfare effects of the acceding economies change from negative 
under Scenario 2 to positive under this scenario in 2025-2030. Among the TPP-16 
countries, Korea’s welfare gain from the three economies’ accession to the TPP are large, 
primarily because of its high trade dependence on China. 
Under Scenario 4A, TPP and enlarged TPP are followed by FTAAP, which is 
assumed to be launched in 2025, and 60% of the FTA for APEC countries will be 
implemented during 2025-2030. By 2030 welfare gains of APEC countries become 
significantly greater compared with those under Scenario 1. The size of welfare gains in 
those years is larger for most of the prospective TPP-19 members, in comparison with 
Scenario 3. When the mega-regional FTAs are assumed to induce productivity growth in 
manufacturing sectors in Scenario 4B, the magnitudes of welfare gains for the FTA 
                                                 
8  Before Taiwan becomes a member of the RCEP grouping, its welfare is predicted to fall by 
considerably more than other nonmembers, largely because the shares of its trade with ASEAN+6 
countries is high (about 60% of its total trade) and the extent of trade diversion would be relatively large. 
Thus, it has a strong incentive to join the RCEP. 
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members are amplified considerably.9 The welfare gain for the United States increases to 
1.0%, compared with 0.2% when productivity growth is assumed to be fixed. Thus, for 
some countries economic impacts resulting from productivity gain through a competitive 
effect could become larger than those resulting from tariff cuts and reductions in NTBs. 
Scenario 4C adds the assumption that real trade cost among the members of the 
mega-regional FTAs falls over time. The cost-mitigating effect of consolidating FTAs is 
particularly large for the economies with large exports-GDP and imports-GDP ratios, such 
as Singapore and Malaysia. However, the results should be interpreted with caution 
because we do not know to what extent compliance costs associated with rules of origin 
would be reduced by creations of mega-regional FTAs such as the TPP and FTAAP. 
In Scenario 4D, the assumption that productivity of Japan’s agricultural sectors 
increases from 1% to 1.5% per annum starting in 2018 is added. The Japanese government 
has approved a plan to phase out gentan – the system that has paid farmers to reduce rice 
crops since 1971 – by 2018. In addition, in December 2013 the Japanese Diet enacted a bill 
to consolidate small plots of agricultural land.10 Under this law, prefectural governments 
will establish farmland banks. The banks will borrow pieces of farmland from small-scale 
part-time farmers or those who have stopped farming, and consolidate and lease them to 
large-scale farmers. These policies are expected to improve productivity of agricultural 
sectors in Japan. Other prospective reforms include provisions of direct payments to full-
time farmers, abolitions of subsidies to part-time farmers, lessening regulations on 
corporations to participate in agricultural production, and reforming the distribution system 
of agricultural inputs and final products. It remains to be seen to what extent the Japanese 
government would carry out agricultural policy reforms. 
If the Japanese government is successful in accomplishing reforms and improving 
productivity of its agricultural sectors, then Japan’s welfare gains in 2030 are projected to 
                                                 
9 Using the plant-level data in manufacturing sectors, Trefler (2004) finds that labor productivity in 
industries that experienced the deepest Canadian and U.S. tariff cuts from the Canada-U.S. FTA 
increased 14-15 percent. Thus, additional productivity growth of 0.1 percentage point per year in this 
study might be rather conservative, particularly in sectors with relatively high initial tariffs. 
10 Honma (2010) states that agricultural land per farm in Japan is about 1/120 of that in the United 
States and between 1/45 and 1/20 of that in European countries. 
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increase by 0.3 percentage point compared with the case of no reforms. Other countries’ 
economic welfare is virtually unchanged. Considering that agriculture accounted for only 
1.1% of Japan’s GDP in 2012, an increase of 0.3 percentage point in welfare is large. 
Lower prices of agricultural products would reduce intermediate input cost of processed 
food sectors and some services sectors. 
 
4.2   Sectoral Output Adjustments 
 
Structural adjustments and resource reallocations result from trade accords. The FTA 
groupings and differences in the initial tariff rates across sectors and member countries 
play a critical role in determining the direction of the adjustments in sectoral output. Other 
factors that affect the magnitude and direction of output adjustments for each product 
category include the import-demand ratio, the export-output ratio, the share of each 
imported intermediate input in total costs, and the elasticity of substitution between 
domestic and imported products.11  
Tables 5.1-5.3 present the sectoral output adjustments for Japan, the United States 
and Vietnam, expressed in percent deviations from the baseline in 2030.12 In Japan, the 
change in rice output is rather small under all scenarios because the tariff rate on this 
commodity is assumed to be fixed. Output of other grains and dairy products contracts by 
more than 10% under most of the scenarios, while that of meats decreases by more than 
9% under all scenarios except Scenarios 1 and 4D. Output of sugar and livestock contracts 
3-6% with exceptions of livestock under Scenario 1 and both sectors under Scenario 4D. 
Output of other crops (consisting mostly of vegetables, fruits and oil seeds) and other food 
products expand slightly under most cases.  
                                                 
11 A sector with a larger import-demand ratio generally suffers from proportionately larger output 
contraction through greater import penetration when initial tariff levels are relatively high. In contrast, a 
sector with a higher export-output ratio typically experiences a larger extent of output expansion, as a 
result of the removal of tariffs in the member countries. The share of imported intermediate inputs in the 
total cost of a downstream industry (e.g., the share of imported textiles in the cost of the apparel 
industry) would evidently affect the magnitude and direction of output adjustments in the latter sector. 
Finally, the greater the values of substitution elasticities between domestic and imported products, the 
greater the sensitivity of the import-domestic demand ratio to changes in the relative price of imports, 
thereby magnifying the effects of FTAs. 
12 The sectoral output effects for other regions in the model are available upon request from the corre-
sponding author. 
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When agricultural productivity in Japan is assumed to increase from 1% to 1.5% 
per annum under Scenario 4D, the extent of contraction would be reduced significantly in 
other grains, but not in dairy products (Table 5.1). In sugar, livestock and meats output 
changes become positive, whereas in other crops and other food products output expands 
by 5-6%. These results suggest that appropriate policy reforms would sufficiently 
strengthen the competitiveness of Japan’s agricultural and processed food sectors other 
than daily products. 
Under most of the scenarios, the manufacturing and services sectors in Japan 
increase with the exception of apparel, machinery, electronic equipment, other transport 
equipment and air transport. The contraction of the apparel sector results from the removal 
of relatively high tariffs and sharp increase in imports from China, except under Scenario 2 
in which China remains nonmember of the TPP. The reduction in output of electronic 
equipment in Japan is also reported by Petri et al. (2014) and might result from Japanese 
electronics manufacturers’ relocation to China and ASEAN countries, fragmentation of 
production processes and substantial increase in imports of both parts and components  and 
assembled products from emerging Asia.13 For similar reasons, output of machinery and 
other transport equipment contracts in Japan. Finally, the reduction in air transport appears 
to suggest that Japan’s comparative advantage in sea transport and the resulting 
substitution from air transport to sea transport. 
In the United States, meats, dairy products and other food products expand in the 
TPP, enlarged TPP, and all Trans-Pacific scenarios (Scenarios 2, 3 and 4A-4D, Table 5.2). 
Among the manufacturing sectors, the nonferrous metal sector, consisting of aluminum, 
copper and other nonferrous metals, are expected to expand considerably, particularly 
under the scenarios in which China becomes a member country. Other manufacturing 
sectors that are projected to increase output include wood and paper, petroleum products 
and chemical products. By contrast, output of machinery, electronic equipment and metal 
                                                 
13 Kimura and Obashi (2010, 2011) show the increasing importance in machinery parts and components 
in intra-East Asian trade, particularly in electronic parts and components. In 2007, 17% of total intra-
regional merchandise exports are accounted for by ICT-related parts and components in East Asia, 
whereas the corresponding figures are only 2-3% in Europe and the Americas (Kimura and Obashi, 
2010, p. 10). 
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products would decline relative to the baseline. While the motor vehicles sector is expected 
to contract in Scenarios 2, 3 and 4A, it is projected to expand in Scenario 4B when 
productivity is assumed to increase from 1% a year to 1.1% a year. Finally, all services 
sectors are estimated to increase their output. 
Table 5.3 summarizes Vietnam’s sectoral output adjustments. We have chosen 
Vietnam because it is a rapidly growing economy with relatively high tariffs and NTBs on 
imports from countries that it does not have free-trade accords. The percentage changes in 
sectoral output are large in many sectors, particularly in manufacturing. In particular, the 
textiles sectors would expand by 44-58% and the apparel sector would expand by 63-90% 
relative to the baseline under Scenarios 2, 3 and 4A-4D. Other notable sectors that expand 
include machinery, electronic equipment and motor vehicles. While large presence of 
multinational corporations, fragmentation of production processes and global production 
networks appear to contribute to substantial increases in output of these sectors, further 
investigation would be required to determine the large percentage increases in sectoral 
output. 
 
5.  Conclusion  
In this paper, we have used the dynamic GTAP model to investigate how mega-
regional FTAs in the Asia-Pacific region might affect the welfare changes and sectoral 
output adjustments. A comparison of the RCEP and TPP scenarios suggest that more Asian 
countries are expected to realize larger welfare gains under the former. This is largely 
caused by the fact that most Asian countries have greater trade shares with RCEP countries 
than with envisaged TPP-16 countries. However, the differences in welfare gains between 
the two tracks are relatively small in 2030 and are sensitive to assumptions in the baseline 
scenario. As China, India and Taiwan are assumed to join the TPP, and the enlarged TPP is 
followed by FTAAP, welfare gains of APEC countries become significantly greater 
compared with the RCEP scenario. 
When the mega-regional FTAs are assumed to exerts a positive effect on 
productivity in manufacturing sectors, the magnitudes of welfare gains for the FTA 
members increase significantly. Furthermore, when implementations of mega-regional 
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FTAs are assumed to lead to reductions in compliance costs associated with rules of origin, 
it would also boost welfare gains of the member economies. Finally, when Japan’s 
agricultural policy reforms would result in an increase in productivity of its agricultural 
sectors by 0.5 percentage point per annum, its overall welfare gains are expected to 
increase by 0.3 percentage point relative to the case where agricultural productivity is fixed.  
With respect to sectoral output adjustments, there appear to be no significant 
differences among the first six policy scenarios for countries that are both members of the 
RCEP and the TPP. In Japan, output of many agricultural and processed food sectors 
contract, while that of manufacturing and services sectors expand with the exception of 
apparel, machinery, electronic equipment, other transport equipment and air transport. In 
many emerging Asian countries, output of textiles, apparel, machinery, electronic 
equipment and other transport equipment is projected to increase. 
When Japan’s agricultural productivity is assumed to increase by 0.5 percentage 
point per annum, the extent of output contraction of agricultural and processed food sectors 
in the country would be reduced significantly except for dairy products. Output changes in 
some of the products, such as sugar, livestock and meats, are predicted to become positive, 
indicating the beneficial effects of agricultural policy reforms in Japan. 
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Table 1: Regional and sectoral aggregation 
 
A. Regional aggregation     
  Country/region Corresponding economies/regions in the GTAP 8 database    
 1 Japan Japan 
 2 China China, Hong Kong 
 3 Korea Korea 
 4 Taiwan Taiwan 
 5 Singapore Singapore 
 6 Indonesia Indonesia 
 7 Malaysia Malaysia 
 8 Philippines Philippines 
 9 Thailand Thailand 
 10 Vietnam Vietnam 
 11 Rest of ASEAN Cambodia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Myanmar, rest of  
   Southeast Asia 
 12 India India 
 13 Australia Australia 
 14 New Zealand New Zealand 
 15 United States United States 
 16 Canada Canada 
 17 Mexico Mexico 
 18 Chile Chile 
 19 Peru Peru 
 20 Russia Russian Federation 
 21 EU-28 Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom 
 22 Rest of world All the other economies/regions   
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Table 1 (continued) 
 
B. Sectoral aggregation     
  Sector Corresponding commodities/sectors in the GTAP 8 database    
 1 Rice Paddy rice, processed rice 
 2 Other grains Wheat, cereal grains nec 
 3 Sugar Sugar, sugar cane and sugar beet 
 4 Other crops Vegetables and fruits, oil seeds, plant-based fibers, crops nec 
 5 Livestock Cattle, sheep and goats, animal products nec, raw milk, wool  
 6 Fossil fuels Coal, oil, gas 
 7 Natural resources Forestry, fishing, minerals nec 
 8 Meats Cattle, sheep, goat, and horse meat products, meat products nec 
 9 Dairy products Dairy products 
 10 Other food products Vegetable oils, food products nec, beverages and tobacco products 
 11 Textiles Textiles 
 12 Apparel Wearing apparel, leather products 
 13 Wood and paper Wood products, paper products, publishing 
 14 Petroleum products Petroleum, coal products 
 15 Chemical products Chemical, rubber, plastic products 
 16 Steel Iron and steel 
 17 Nonferrous metal Nonferrous metal 
 18 Metal products Fabricated metal products  
 19 Machinery Machinery and equipment 
 20 Electronic equipment Electronic equipment 
 21 Motor vehicles Motor vehicles and parts 
 22 Other transport equip. Transport equipment nec 
 23 Other manufactures Mineral products nec, manufactures nec 
 24 Construction and utilities Construction, electricity, gas manufacture and distribution, water 
 25 Trade Trade 
 26 Sea transport Sea transport 
 27 Air transport Air transport 
 28 Other transport Other transport 
29 Communication Communication 
30 Financial services Insurance, financial services nec 
 31 Other private services Business services, recreation and other services 
 32 Government services Public administration and defense, education, health services    
Source: GTAP database, version 8.1. 
Note: nec = not elsewhere classified. 
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Table 2: Tariff rates on merchandise imports and tariff equivalents of nontariff barriers on services, 2004 (%) 
Sector
1 Rice 421.7 1.4 4.7 0.2 0.0 8.6 39.7 49.9 5.8 13.5 2.6
2 Other grains 27.4 1.7 5.2 2.9 0.0 2.6 0.0 5.1 2.5 4.2 1.5
3 Sugar 39.4 0.1 3.6 10.4 0.0 20.4 0.0 21.7 12.1 16.5 6.2
4 Other crops 4.6 2.8 51.2 8.2 0.0 2.2 10.6 6.7 13.1 13.0 8.0
5 Livestock 5.7 15.7 6.5 5.2 0.0 3.0 0.1 5.9 4.7 1.3 3.3
6 Fossil fuels 0.0 0.1 2.7 1.0 0.0 0.0 2.2 3.0 0.0 1.1 1.1
7 Natural resources 0.2 0.3 1.1 1.5 0.0 1.0 0.2 2.9 1.5 2.1 2.9
8 Meats 24.1 4.7 29.3 16.3 0.0 3.6 0.3 15.8 15.5 18.8 4.7
9 Dairy products 53.3 6.4 45.0 11.2 0.0 4.3 0.8 1.8 9.1 17.3 7.1
10 Other food products 9.9 4.7 30.6 14.3 0.6 7.0 10.6 5.6 14.6 16.3 10.9
11 Textiles 6.3 5.3 8.4 7.6 0.0 7.5 7.1 7.2 6.6 28.8 7.7
12 Apparel 9.6 4.0 8.9 8.1 0.0 7.5 7.9 9.1 20.2 19.1 11.6
13 Wood and paper 1.0 1.7 1.9 0.9 0.0 3.1 4.6 5.0 5.8 7.8 5.3
14 Petroleum products 0.3 4.5 4.4 2.6 0.0 0.7 0.4 2.4 9.2 14.7 8.4
15 Chemical products 1.0 6.1 4.8 3.0 0.0 3.7 3.8 4.0 7.0 4.5 3.8
16 Steel 0.9 3.9 0.3 0.4 0.0 4.1 17.4 2.9 4.1 3.9 2.2
17 Nonferrous metal 0.4 2.8 2.4 1.0 0.0 2.8 3.4 2.0 1.5 0.9 3.6
18 Metal products 0.4 8.2 5.3 6.1 0.0 6.0 8.4 6.5 11.2 10.9 4.1
19 Machinery 0.1 6.1 5.3 3.1 0.0 2.7 2.2 2.4 5.1 4.4 4.5
20 Electronic equipment 0.0 1.2 1.2 1.9 0.0 0.6 0.1 0.5 1.5 4.7 6.2
21 Motor vehicles 0.0 14.6 7.2 12.1 0.0 11.9 14.0 11.6 23.6 23.2 19.1
22 Other transport equip. 0.0 2.8 1.2 3.9 0.0 1.8 2.0 3.9 3.8 12.2 7.2
23 Other manufactures 0.6 6.0 6.0 5.0 0.0 6.5 6.7 5.3 8.7 15.8 6.0
24 Construction and utilities 5.0 25.2 13.0 10.8 0.0 64.4 17.4 52.6 44.9 53.7 20.6
25 Trade 22.7 109.6 33.0 28.8 1.3 98.5 36.0 80.2 63.5 82.7 32.5
26 Sea transport 7.6 21.5 15.7 12.6 1.3 67.3 17.6 53.5 40.5 54.4 6.4
27 Air transport 19.5 61.5 29.4 25.4 1.3 91.9 32.1 74.6 58.7 76.7 28.4
28 Other transport 20.2 74.3 30.2 26.1 1.3 93.4 33.0 75.8 59.7 78.0 14.9
29 Communication 17.8 48.1 27.4 23.6 1.3 88.4 30.0 71.5 56.1 73.5 32.8
30 Financial services 17.1 83.3 30.4 27.5 1.5 92.5 30.2 72.6 58.1 74.7 20.0
31 Other private services 16.6 81.2 29.2 26.7 1.5 91.1 29.8 70.8 54.9 73.7 7.3
32 Government services 25.9 84.1 34.3 29.1 2.8 97.8 36.5 76.9 61.5 84.2 24.1
Japan China Korea Taiwan Singapore Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Thailand Vietnam Rest ofASEAN
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Table 2 (continued) 
Sector
1 Rice 39.0 0.0 0.0 1.9 0.0 0.2 5.8 17.7 9.3 8.9 15.9
2 Other grains 98.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.2 0.5 8.0 2.4 1.3 9.9
3 Sugar 91.7 0.0 0.0 24.2 0.4 5.1 2.6 2.5 50.1 25.7 15.0
4 Other crops 34.1 0.4 0.0 2.1 0.2 1.3 1.1 8.0 5.7 1.5 8.5
5 Livestock 11.9 0.1 0.0 0.3 16.3 0.5 0.3 6.7 4.3 0.4 3.8
6 Fossil fuels 11.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.4 0.0 0.1 0.0 1.3
7 Natural resources 9.6 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 1.6 0.1 6.9 2.6 0.1 1.5
8 Meats 21.7 0.2 0.8 2.4 31.0 0.7 3.4 10.8 23.8 5.1 19.8
9 Dairy products 31.9 2.1 1.3 15.0 146.0 6.1 0.9 16.3 7.4 1.4 14.0
10 Other food products 79.8 1.6 1.0 2.1 10.9 2.5 1.1 4.0 12.9 1.5 13.1
11 Textiles 15.9 9.1 6.0 7.0 6.5 4.6 3.3 13.5 12.4 2.1 9.6
12 Apparel 13.2 11.7 11.5 9.8 11.7 16.7 3.8 16.3 16.5 3.4 10.0
13 Wood and paper 13.5 3.0 1.3 0.2 0.6 1.6 0.9 5.8 11.3 0.1 5.4
14 Petroleum products 13.9 0.0 0.1 0.7 0.3 0.8 1.7 2.5 4.0 0.2 4.5
15 Chemical products 13.8 1.9 1.5 1.1 0.6 1.3 0.8 6.1 8.7 0.4 4.0
16 Steel 19.0 3.4 1.6 0.2 0.1 2.4 1.2 6.0 3.0 0.1 4.8
17 Nonferrous metal 14.9 0.6 0.9 0.6 0.0 0.6 0.8 4.4 3.9 0.4 1.3
18 Metal products 14.9 4.3 3.0 1.4 1.0 2.8 1.1 7.1 12.1 0.4 6.8
19 Machinery 14.0 2.3 2.5 0.7 0.4 2.8 0.8 5.4 4.4 0.4 4.9
20 Electronic equipment 2.4 0.9 0.9 0.3 0.2 1.4 0.6 5.1 6.0 0.7 3.6
21 Motor vehicles 24.7 12.4 7.2 0.6 1.0 3.5 3.1 7.2 10.6 0.9 9.7
22 Other transport equip. 6.5 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.7 1.6 0.2 8.9 9.3 0.7 4.7
23 Other manufactures 14.7 2.8 2.6 1.2 1.1 3.4 1.1 9.0 12.3 0.6 6.0
24 Construction and utilities 109.7 4.3 1.0 2.3 9.2 40.8 25.8 27.2 52.9 5.6 26.7
25 Trade 153.3 18.2 8.2 6.8 20.7 61.8 33.8 51.0 73.5 12.0 48.2
26 Sea transport 109.6 3.3 3.3 6.8 6.0 38.8 16.7 30.7 48.2 5.4 22.0
27 Air transport 144.1 15.1 5.7 6.8 17.6 56.9 30.2 46.7 68.1 11.1 49.5
28 Other transport 146.1 15.7 6.2 6.8 18.3 58.0 31.0 47.7 69.3 10.3 39.9
29 Communication 139.2 13.4 4.3 6.8 15.9 54.3 28.3 44.4 65.3 9.3 36.6
30 Financial services 139.5 13.5 4.3 7.8 19.8 57.6 27.5 46.4 65.9 8.7 43.3
31 Other private services 137.1 13.5 3.7 7.8 19.2 58.2 26.5 43.8 65.1 9.7 40.5
32 Government services 154.8 23.5 10.2 6.3 17.5 60.3 33.0 47.3 69.7 14.2 45.8
India Australia New Zealand
United 
States Canada Russia EU-27
Rest of
worldMexico Chile Peru
 
Sources: Sectors 1-23: GTAP database, version 8.1. Sectors 24-32: averages of the gravity-model estimates of Wang et al. (2009) and the values employed by the 
Michigan Model of World Production and Trade. 
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Table 3: Policy scenarios and assumptions 
2016-17 2018 2019 2020-21 2022-23 2024 2025 2026-27
 TPP-16 (2020-2029)
2028-30
Scenario 1: 
RCEP
 RCEP (ASEAN+6 FTA) (2018-2027)
 RCEP+Taiwan (2022-2030)
 Assumptions: 
 1) NTBs on services and logistic time in merchandise trade are cut by 20%.
 2) Rice is excluded from trade liberalization.
Scenario 2: TPP
 TPP-13 (2016-2025)
 TPP-16 (2020-2029)
 Same assumptions as in Scenario 1.
Scenario 4C: 
Trans-Pacific + 
productivity gain 
+ trade cost 
reduction
 Same FTA sequencing as in Scenario 4A
 Assumptions: 
 1) - 3) are same as in Scenario 4B. 
 4) Real trade cost falls by 0.1% per year among TPP-13 countries during 2016-18, 
among TPP-16 countries during 2019-21, and among TPP-19 countries during 2022-24. It 
falls by 0.2% per year among FTAAP countries during 2025-30. Reductions in real trade 
cost are assumed to result from lower administrative costs associated with consolidations 
 TPP-19 (2024-2030) (70% implemented)
 Same assumptions as in Scenario 1.
Scenario 4A: 
Trans-Pacific
 TPP-13 (2016-2025)
 TPP-16 (2019-2028)
 TPP-19 (2022-2030) (90% implemented)
Scenario 3: 
Enlarged TPP
 TPP-13 (2016-2025)
FTAAP (2025-30) (60% impl.)
 Same assumptions as in Scenario 1.
Scenario 4B: 
Trans-Pacific + 
productivity gain
 Same FTA sequencing as in Scenario 4A
 Assumptions: 
 1) and 2) are same as in Scenario 1.
 3) Efficiency on overall output (ao) for manufacturing sectors 8-23 increases from 1% a 
year to 1.1% a year in TPP-13 countries during 2016-18, in TPP-16 countries during 
2019-21, in TPP-19 countries during 2022-24, and in FTAAP countries during 2025-30.
Scenario 4D: 
Trans-Pacific + 
prod gain + trade 
cost reduc + ag  
reform in Japan
 Same FTA sequencing as in Scenario 4A
 Assumptions: 
 1) - 4) are same as in Scenario 4C. 
 5) Starting in 2018, efficiency on overall output (ao) for sectors 1-5 in Japan increases 
from 1% a year to 1.5% a year, resulting from Japan's agricultural policy reform.   
Note: RCEP: 10 ASEAN members plus China, Japan, Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand. TPP-13: Australia, 
Canada, Brunei, Chile, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, United States and Vietnam. 
TPP-16: TPP-13 plus Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand. TPP-19: TPP-16 plus China, India and Taiwan. 
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Table 4: The welfare effects of mega-regional FTAs 
(Percentage deviations in utility from the baseline) 
2020 2025 2030 2020 2025 2030 2020 2025 2030 2020 2025 2030
Japan 0.21 0.59 0.88 0.24 0.59 0.77 0.24 0.64 0.87 0.24 0.69 0.96
China 0.30 0.58 0.56 -0.07 -0.16 -0.21 -0.07 0.12 0.58 -0.08 0.37 0.83
Korea 0.73 2.37 3.41 0.55 1.41 1.84 0.55 1.71 3.09 0.56 2.04 3.53
Taiwan -0.23 0.75 3.40 -0.05 -0.16 -0.30 -0.05 0.46 2.35 -0.06 1.12 3.25
Singapore 0.38 1.42 2.21 0.40 1.41 2.40 0.40 1.40 2.06 0.44 1.44 2.06
Indonesia 0.32 1.17 1.57 0.05 0.61 1.11 0.05 0.71 1.49 0.17 0.95 1.60
Malaysia 0.23 0.88 1.05 0.47 1.19 1.42 0.47 1.20 1.24 0.49 1.23 1.24
Philippines 0.29 0.71 0.71 0.07 0.87 2.10 0.07 0.86 1.67 0.19 0.97 1.54
Thailand 0.49 1.19 1.09 -0.01 0.83 1.65 -0.01 0.89 1.50 0.18 1.11 1.45
Vietnam 0.67 2.08 2.68 1.50 2.68 2.66 1.50 2.79 2.94 1.52 2.96 3.17
Rest of ASEAN 0.31 1.15 1.64 -0.07 -0.09 0.00 -0.07 -0.14 0.04 -0.07 0.02 1.12
India 0.61 0.98 0.45 -0.05 -0.21 -0.31 -0.05 0.31 0.92 -0.07 0.75 0.89
Australia 0.43 1.83 2.84 0.15 0.34 0.39 0.15 0.53 1.61 0.16 0.84 2.22
New Zealand 0.19 0.63 0.89 0.31 0.86 0.99 0.31 0.88 0.91 0.31 0.89 0.92
United States -0.02 -0.09 -0.12 0.05 0.12 0.15 0.05 0.12 0.16 0.05 0.12 0.20
Canada -0.04 -0.04 0.04 0.30 0.55 0.59 0.30 0.57 0.73 0.31 0.61 0.82
Mexico -0.02 -0.08 -0.14 0.44 0.79 0.79 0.44 0.82 0.73 0.44 0.83 0.68
Chile 0.07 0.33 0.56 0.33 1.02 1.19 0.33 1.16 1.83 0.33 1.34 2.08
Peru 0.02 0.14 0.23 0.13 0.28 0.27 0.13 0.35 0.53 0.14 0.43 0.64
Russia -0.06 -0.01 0.13 -0.02 -0.01 0.03 -0.02 -0.04 0.06 -0.02 0.05 0.53
EU-28 -0.02 -0.10 -0.18 -0.01 -0.05 -0.12 -0.01 -0.08 -0.25 -0.01 -0.12 -0.38
Rest of world -0.07 -0.06 0.06 -0.04 -0.08 -0.07 -0.04 -0.12 -0.08 -0.04 -0.13 -0.07
Scen. 4A (Trans-Pacific)Scenario 1 (RCEP) Scenario 2 (TPP) Scenario 3 (Enlarged TPP)
 
Definitions of scenarios: 
Scenario 1: RCEP from 2018-2027 and RCEP + Taiwan from 2022-2030. Scenario 2: TPP-13 from 2016-2025 and TPP-16 from 2020-2029. Scenario 3: 
TPP-13 from 2016-2025, TPP-16 from 2020-2029 and TPP-19 from 2024. 70% of TPP-19 will be implemented in 2030.  Scenario 4A: TPP-13, TPP-16 
and TPP-19 will be implemented during 2016-2025, 2019-2028 and 2022-2030, respectively. FTAAP will start from 2025 and 60% of the accord will be 
implemented in 2030. Scenario 4B: Same as Scenario 4A, except that efficiency on overall output for manufacturing sectors is assumed to increase from 
1% a year to 1.1% a year in the TPP-13, TPP-16, TPP-19 and FTAAP countries during 2016-18, 2019-21, 2022-24 and 2025-30, respectively. Scenario 
4C: Same as Scenario 4B, except that real trade cost is assumed to fall by 0.1% per year among the TPP-13, TPP-16 and TPP-19 countries during 2016-18, 
2019-21 and 2022-24, respectively. In addition, it is assumed to fall by 0.2% per year among the FTAAP countries during 2025-30. Scenario 4D: Same as 
Scenario 4C, except that efficiency on overall output for Japan’s agricultural sectors is assumed to increases from 1% a year to 1.5% a year from 2018. 
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Table 4 (continued) 
2020 2025 2030 2020 2025 2030 2020 2025 2030
Japan 0.76 1.70 2.41 0.86 1.97 3.02 0.91 2.14 3.35
China 0.02 1.23 2.40 0.02 1.43 2.96 0.02 1.43 2.95
Korea 1.61 4.19 6.58 1.83 4.84 8.07 1.83 4.83 8.05
Taiwan 0.10 1.89 4.69 0.11 2.29 6.03 0.12 2.31 6.06
Singapore 1.14 3.05 4.59 1.55 4.40 7.87 1.55 4.40 7.87
Indonesia 0.35 1.63 2.75 0.39 1.96 3.63 0.40 1.97 3.64
Malaysia 1.16 2.90 3.75 1.46 3.89 5.91 1.46 3.90 5.93
Philippines 0.56 2.16 3.26 0.66 2.83 5.05 0.66 2.85 5.09
Thailand 0.65 2.63 3.65 0.78 3.39 5.45 0.78 3.39 5.46
Vietnam 1.93 3.88 4.62 2.29 4.89 6.76 2.28 4.89 6.76
Rest of ASEAN -0.19 -0.01 1.47 -0.25 -0.01 2.07 -0.23 0.06 2.19
India 0.01 1.38 2.04 0.02 1.56 2.59 0.01 1.54 2.55
Australia 0.26 1.13 2.82 0.32 1.32 3.32 0.31 1.31 3.31
New Zealand 0.64 1.72 2.25 0.75 2.04 2.94 0.74 2.01 2.87
United States 0.32 0.68 1.06 0.36 0.78 1.28 0.35 0.77 1.26
Canada 0.46 1.00 1.58 0.63 1.43 2.50 0.63 1.42 2.49
Mexico 0.87 1.69 1.88 1.08 2.18 2.79 1.09 2.19 2.79
Chile 0.62 2.32 3.66 0.75 2.80 4.74 0.74 2.79 4.72
Peru 0.48 1.20 1.92 0.53 1.36 2.30 0.53 1.35 2.29
Russia -0.11 0.07 0.95 -0.14 0.04 1.08 -0.14 0.05 1.10
EU-28 0.02 -0.14 -0.52 0.02 -0.14 -0.60 0.02 -0.15 -0.60
Rest of world -0.15 -0.27 -0.10 -0.19 -0.36 -0.25 -0.19 -0.35 -0.24
Scen. 4B (Trans-Pacific with Scen. 4C (Trans-Pacific with Scen. 4D (Trans-Pacific with
productivity gain) productivity gain and trade 
cost reduction)
prod gain, trade cost reduction
and Japan’s ag policy reform)
  
Source: Model simulations.  
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Table 5.1: Japan’s sectoral output adjustments for the year 2030 
(Percentage deviation from the baseline) 
 
Sector 1  2  3  4A 4B 4C 4D
Rice 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.4 2.5
Other grains -5.4 -11.5 -10.7 -11.0 -12.0 -13.1 -3.2
Sugar -3.1 -4.4 -3.5 -3.5 -3.1 -3.2 0.2
Other crops -0.2 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.1 5.7
Livestock 0.0 -6.1 -4.8 -4.6 -4.5 -4.6 4.8
Fossil fuels -3.9 -3.1 -3.6 -4.0 -6.0 -6.9 -7.4
Natural resources 0.7 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.9 0.9 1.0
Meats -0.2 -10.5 -9.9 -9.9 -9.3 -10.3 1.1
Dairy products -7.9 -21.5 -14.8 -14.8 -13.5 -14.1 -10.1
Other food products 1.7 2.1 2.1 2.1 4.0 4.5 5.4
Textiles 12.6 10.0 11.9 12.8 12.8 13.0 11.0
Apparel -5.1 1.1 -2.4 -3.5 -2.2 -3.0 -3.3
Wood and paper 0.7 0.3 0.4 0.3 1.0 0.8 0.7
Petroleum products 3.8 1.7 3.2 3.7 5.7 6.8 6.8
Chemical products 5.2 2.5 3.6 4.0 5.9 6.2 5.7
Steel 3.4 1.5 3.1 3.2 4.6 5.5 4.8
Nonferrous metal 5.7 4.8 3.6 2.8 3.8 5.8 5.1
Metal products 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.2 1.2 0.7 0.6
Machinery -1.7 -1.2 -1.2 -2.0 -2.5 -4.0 -5.0
Electronic equipment -4.8 -2.5 -3.5 -4.3 -4.9 -8.4 -9.0
Motor vehicles -0.4 2.7 1.4 2.3 3.9 2.8 1.9
Other transport equip. -7.2 -1.5 -4.5 -6.6 -5.2 -5.7 -6.8
Other manufactures 2.1 2.2 2.0 2.1 4.0 4.1 3.9
Construction and utilities 3.0 2.3 2.5 3.0 6.5 8.2 8.8
Trade 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 2.2 2.7 2.9
Sea transport 1.5 -0.1 1.6 2.0 2.2 2.5 2.3
Air transport -0.7 0.1 -0.3 -0.9 -1.4 -1.2 -1.5
Other transport 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.8 2.1 2.5 2.7
Communication 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 1.5 1.9 2.1
Financial services 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 1.1 1.3 1.4
Other private services 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.7 1.9 2.3 2.5
Government services 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.8 1.0 1.1
Scenarios
  
Definitions of scenarios: See notes on Table 4. 
Source: Model simulations.  
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Table 5.2: U.S. sectoral output adjustments for the year 2030 
(Percentage deviation from the baseline) 
 
Sector 1  2  3  4A 4B 4C 4D
Rice 0.6 -0.7 -0.4 -0.8 -1.1 -1.0 -1.4
Other grains -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.4 -0.7 -0.9 -0.8
Sugar 0.0 -0.9 -0.7 -0.6 -0.3 -0.1 -0.1
Other crops -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.4 -0.4 -0.5 -0.5
Livestock 0.2 0.9 1.2 2.2 2.5 2.8 2.7
Fossil fuels 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
Natural resources 0.1 0.1 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9
Meats 0.6 1.4 1.8 4.8 6.6 7.0 6.9
Dairy products 0.1 3.8 3.6 2.6 4.1 4.5 4.6
Other food products -0.2 1.1 1.1 1.2 2.8 3.1 3.2
Textiles -0.8 -4.6 -8.1 -9.5 -8.3 -9.4 -9.5
Apparel -0.8 -7.7 -12.3 -14.2 -12.1 -13.9 -13.9
Wood and paper -0.1 0.4 0.4 0.4 1.4 1.5 1.5
Petroleum products -0.6 0.3 0.3 0.3 2.0 2.2 2.2
Chemical products -1.0 0.8 0.9 0.9 2.3 2.5 2.5
Steel -0.1 -0.4 0.2 0.0 -0.9 -1.4 -1.3
Nonferrous metal -2.0 0.6 7.4 9.4 10.3 10.7 10.9
Metal products 0.0 -0.3 -1.0 -1.3 -1.0 -1.7 -1.7
Machinery -0.3 -0.5 -1.5 -2.2 -2.1 -3.5 -3.4
Electronic equipment -1.1 -0.4 -1.3 -2.1 -1.4 -3.6 -3.5
Motor vehicles 0.2 -1.8 -1.5 -1.5 0.5 0.1 0.2
Other transport equip. 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.6 -0.2 0.1 0.1
Other manufactures -0.2 0.6 0.0 -0.2 1.1 0.7 0.8
Construction and utilities -0.7 0.1 0.0 0.2 2.0 2.2 2.1
Trade -0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.7 0.7 0.7
Sea transport 0.5 0.3 0.8 1.0 1.6 1.8 1.8
Air transport -0.1 0.3 0.3 0.3 1.2 1.3 1.3
Other transport -0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2 1.1 1.2 1.2
Communication -0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.7 0.7
Financial services -0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.4
Other private services -0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.7 0.7
Government services 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.4
Scenarios
  
Definitions of scenarios: See notes on Table 4. 
Source: Model simulations.  
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Table 5.3: Vietnam’s sectoral output adjustments for the year 2030 
(Percentage deviation from the baseline) 
 
Sector 1  2  3  4A 4B 4C 4D
Rice 0.0 -0.5 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2
Other grains 0.8 3.6 2.8 2.6 2.9 2.2 2.2
Sugar 0.6 0.0 0.6 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.8
Other crops -1.3 -1.3 -1.5 -1.6 -2.5 -3.4 -3.4
Livestock 1.0 0.7 0.9 1.1 1.7 2.2 2.1
Fossil fuels -0.3 -0.5 -0.4 -0.4 -0.7 -0.9 -0.9
Natural resources 1.1 1.7 1.5 1.6 2.4 2.9 2.9
Meats -6.1 -28.7 -26.3 -26.1 -27.9 -32.9 -32.7
Dairy products 2.0 -6.5 -3.8 -2.9 -2.0 -4.2 -4.0
Other food products -1.7 -2.8 -2.9 -2.6 -1.6 -2.4 -2.4
Textiles 16.6 55.4 45.2 43.7 53.5 58.4 58.4
Apparel 36.2 74.0 63.7 63.3 79.2 90.4 90.3
Wood and paper -7.0 -0.8 -3.6 -5.0 -3.3 -5.9 -5.9
Petroleum products -0.1 -2.7 -2.9 -0.8 0.2 -3.1 -3.0
Chemical products 11.5 15.2 15.5 16.0 21.0 22.9 23.1
Steel 14.6 14.0 16.5 17.0 20.3 21.6 21.8
Nonferrous metal 20.5 16.1 19.5 20.5 30.4 33.3 33.3
Metal products 15.4 13.8 16.2 17.7 25.7 33.8 33.8
Machinery 17.8 18.1 22.1 24.9 33.3 39.6 39.9
Electronic equipment 23.3 20.7 26.8 29.0 38.5 44.7 44.7
Motor vehicles 13.6 15.0 15.9 17.1 23.6 29.1 29.4
Other transport equip. 4.3 13.8 9.6 8.6 16.2 21.3 21.3
Other manufactures 7.6 17.3 13.4 13.1 19.3 22.8 22.7
Construction and utilities 14.4 16.6 15.4 16.4 22.8 30.7 30.6
Trade 5.3 7.7 7.3 7.5 10.0 12.8 12.8
Sea transport 17.5 18.9 17.8 19.2 26.4 35.7 35.7
Air transport 17.4 20.5 18.9 19.9 26.7 35.3 35.2
Other transport 8.6 11.4 10.1 10.3 13.5 16.9 16.9
Communication 5.0 8.6 8.4 8.3 9.9 10.9 10.9
Financial services 3.2 5.6 6.4 6.1 6.6 6.0 6.0
Other private services 3.9 5.4 5.8 5.8 7.1 8.6 8.6
Government services 1.0 0.0 0.8 0.9 1.2 1.5 1.4
Scenarios
  
Definitions of scenarios: See notes on Table 4. 
Source: Model simulations.  
 
